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SWITCHING THE DEFAULT RULE
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
There is a standard analysis of default rules in contract law, including those forms
of contract law that fall under the label of employment law. But behavioral eco-
nomics raises many complications. Professor Cass R. Sunstein explains that the
default rule can create an endowment effect, making employees value certain rights
more, simply because they have been granted such rights in the first instance. New
evidence, based on a survey of law students, is introduced to show a significant
endowment effect in the context of vacation time. Similarly, the default rule for
savings plans, set by employers or by law, seems to have a large effect on employee
behavior. When the default rule affects preferences and behavior, conventional ec-
onomic analysis seems indeterminate; either default rule can be efficient. In em-
ployment law, analysis of distributive consequences also suggests the difficulty of
deciding which default rule to favor, because any switch in the rule is unlikely to
have significant redistributive effects. Nonetheless, switching the default rule can, in
certain circumstances, have desirable effects on workers' welfare. A central ques-
tion is whether the stickiness of the default rule reflects a genuine change in values,
or instead, employee confusion or bargaining strategy.
I
INTRODUCTION
A. Puzzles
Begin with three puzzles:
" Legislators in a Midwestern state want to give employees greater
protection against arbitrary discharges. But critics contend that a
new law, flatly banning discharges without cause, would be too
rigid and would ultimately hurt employees themselves. Some peo-
ple have urged a compromise, one that would give employees a
right to be discharged only for cause unless they waive that right
through contract. Would the compromise have good effects?
Would it have any effects at all?
o Employers in a large Midwestern state typically allow their em-
ployees to participate in certain savings plans. Under the existing
plans, employees can elect to devote a specified level of their sala-
ries to savings, in return for tax relief and some contribution from
employers. But only about twenty percent of employees partici-
pate in these plans. State legislators are considering a law that
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago, Law
School and Department of Political Science. B.A., 1975, Harvard College; J.D., 1978,
Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Christine Jolls, Eric Posner, and Richard
Posner for helpful comments and Richard Thaler for helpful discussions.
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would require an "automatic enrollment plan," by which employ-
ees would be enrolled in the plan when hired, but would be ex-
pressly authorized to opt out at the same time. Would the new law
have any effect on savings rates?
There is no ban on age discrimination in a European country. In-
stead of proposing a ban, legislators have urged that employees
should have a presumptive right to be free from age discrimina-
tion, but that employees should be permitted to relinquish that
right through voluntary agreements. Would legislation to this ef-
fect be desirable? What would it accomplish?
In many areas of labor and employment law, it is possible to im-
agine two different sorts of default rules. The employer might be pre-
sumed to have the relevant entitlement, but the employee might be
entitled to bargain for it. This is a system of waivable employers'
rights. Alternatively, the employee might be presumed to have the
entitlement, but the employer might be entitled to bargain for it. This
is a system of waivable employees' rights. The choice between the two
cuts across many substantive issues: job security, vacation time, pa-
rental leave, health care, savings plans, pensions, occupational safety,
and even unionization. In these cases, and others, the legal system
might give the initial entitlement to one or another side. We could
imagine a legal system in which employers enjoy all or most initial
entitlements; we could imagine default rules granting all or most ini-
tial entitlements to employees.
At common law, employers are typically given almost all of the
initial entitlements.' In that sense, the default rules set by the com-
mon law create a system of waivable employers' rights. Of course,
employees have a presumptive right to their own time and labor; em-
ployers may assert a right to the time and labor of workers if and only
if the workers have bound themselves to work. But employees must
specifically bargain for everything else. When the contract is silent, an
employer may discharge an employee for any reason or for no reason
at all;2 may refuse to provide vacation time, parental leave, or health
care; need not offer a safe workplace; need not provide a pension
plan; need not allow unionized workers on the premises.
1 See, e.g., Comerford v. Int'l Harvester Co., 178 So. 894, 895-96 (Ala. 1938) (holding
that employer may discharge employee where employee's superior attempted to "alienate
the affections of [employee's] wife," and having failed in this effort, caused employer to
terminate its contract with employee).
2 See, e.g., Clarke v. Atl. Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423, 425 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908) (hold-
ing that contract of indefinite term is assumed to be at will).
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Contrary to appearances, there is nothing natural or inevitable
about this state of affairs. When an employer is authorized to deny an
employee a safe workplace, or vacation time, and when there is no
contractual provision on the point, the law has made a choice about
the (right) starting place for bargaining. It would be easy to imagine a
legal system, fully committed to freedom of contract, that began with
default rules giving certain entitlements to employees. My principal
questions in this Essay are simple: Would a switch of the entitlement
matter? If so, exactly how?
B. Five Sets of Claims
Of course, many statutes create nonwaivable rights.3 They bypass
the question of default rules entirely by banning bargaining alto-
gether. There are many reasons why legislatures and courts might
take this approach. Perhaps third-party effects argue against waiver.
Perhaps waivers would be inadequately informed; behavioral econom-
ics offers a number of reasons why this might be so.4 Perhaps
nonwaivable rights can be justified, in the context of accommodation
mandates, on redistributive grounds.5 But I seek here to cast light on
a different question: When should employment and labor law pro-
ceed, not by preventing bargaining, but by switching the relevant enti-
tlement from employers to employees?
Much recent attention has been paid to switching entitlements;
for example, freedom from age discrimination now takes the form of a
waivable workers' right.6 Anecdotal evidence suggests that employers
often ask employees to waive race and sex discrimination claims,
though such waivers are unlikely to be enforceable. Another example
is the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allows employees to waive
their right not to work more than forty hours a week, but only at a
governmentally determined premium ("time and a half"). 7 Or con-
sider the Model Employment Termination Act, which allows employ-
ees to waive the right to for-cause discharge, but only on the basis of
3 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994)
(nonwaivable right to certain safety regulations); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1994) (nonwaivable right to family leave).
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va. L. Rev. 205,
240-43 (2001) (discussing cognitive difficulties).
5 See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000) (discuss-
ing distributional effects of accommodation mandates, which require employers to accom-
modate certain classes of workers).
6 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (1994). Note that the right is waivable for past violations, not
for future violations.
7 § 207(f).
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an agreement by the employer to provide a severance agreement in
the event of a discharge not based on poor job performance. 8
For purposes of the present discussion, let us put to one side
those cases where transaction costs impede bargaining. Everyone
agrees that these are situations in which the default rule might well
turn out to matter, and prove "sticky," simply because it is costly to
contract around it.9 I will focus instead on cases in which there are no
such transaction costs. I urge, most generally, that in such cases, the
default rule will matter, but that we can find little guidance from the
traditional criteria of efficiency and distribution. The key questions
are whether the switch of the entitlement genuinely changes values, as
opposed to bargaining strategies, and if so whether the switch im-
proves workers' welfare. In some cases, the switch in entitlement will
indeed be defensible as a way of making workers' lives better. The
default rule for savings is a possible example. More particularly, I at-
tempt to support the following points:
1. The switch of the entitlement might well make a difference
simply by virtue of the endowment effect-the effect of the initial al-
location of the right on people's valuations, possibly employers and
almost certainly workers. 10 When the endowment effect is at work,
preferences and valuations are affected by the initial allocation of the
entitlement; contrary to the Coase Theorem, there is no prelegal
"preference" from which the legal system can work. The default rule
might matter because it has a legitimating effect, carrying important
information about what most people are expected to do." If workers
8 Model Employment Termination Act § 4(c) (1991), reprinted in Samuel Estreicher
& Michael C. Harper, Statutory Supplement to Cases and Materials on Employment Dis-
crimination and Employment Law 305-15 (2000).
9 For a much-cited discussion, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing
different kinds of default rules).
10 See Richard H. Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics 169, 184-86 (1991). The endow-
ment effect might be small or nonexistent for employers if legal entitlements are, for em-
ployers, akin to money tokens. See id. at 176. We would not expect hardware stores to
show an endowment effect for mousetraps and hammers; for hardware stores, these goods
are a form of cash. The question, not yet resolved, is whether legal entitlements have the
same characteristic for employers in the context of labor and employment law. Some evi-
dence is provided in Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects
Within Corporate Agency Relationships (Aug. 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/ab-
stract=276110, with the finding that endowment effects are greatly reduced when agents
are acting for others. Id. Perhaps those acting for employers-such as supervisors and
personnel officers-are generally "agents," not subject to the endowment effect.
11 I will discuss this possibility in several places below; I believe that in some settings, it
accounts for what is described as an endowment effect, and perhaps should be thought
different from the endowment effect. Social scientists have yet to sort out the relationship
between this legitimating effect and the endowment effect, as found in Daniel Kahneman
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value a right more simply because it has been initially allocated to
them, and less because it has not been so allocated, a switch in the
initial allocation will matter by definition. The principal qualification
here is that people might be unaware of the legal rule. They might
order their affairs on the basis of norms, rather than law.12 If this is
so, the switch in the entitlement is unlikely to matter.
2. A switch in default rules might be supported by traditional
economic analysis of "penalty defaults," alongside a behaviorally in-
formed understanding that employees likely err about the law. Em-
ployees often lack information about their legal rights, showing
excessive optimism,13 and the switch of the entitlement from employ-
ers to employees might increase the flow of information between the
parties and to the legal system.14 Suppose, for example, that if em-
ployees are given certain rights by the default rule, employers will
want to buy those rights. If this is the case, we will see a system in
which certain information is disclosed to employees, simply as part of
the process by which employers bargain. A switch in the legal rule,
moving the initial allocation of the entitlement from employer to em-
ployee, might give important information to workers when workers
would otherwise overstate their legal rights.' 5
3. A default rule in favor of the employee might be undesirable if
some cognitive or motivational failure will lead the employee to de-
mand an excessive amount in order to trade. Suppose, for example,
that employees would gain little from a contractual right to be fired
only for "just cause." (Employees might have little to gain if dis-
charges rarely occur without cause; in that case, the contractual provi-
sion would give employees a right that they enjoy in any event.)
Suppose too that if employees are initially given that right, they will
not trade it, even for a high price. If this is so, a switch in the entitle-
ment, from employers to employees, would be hard to defend as a
way of improving the welfare of workers. Because employees would
refuse to trade the right, even though it does them little good, the
result would be a situation in which their overall compensation pack-
age is actually inferior.
et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in Behavioral
Law and Economics 211 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1999) (discussing endowment effect).
12 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(1991) (discussing control of conduct through norms irrespective of legal rules).
13 See Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 118-22 (1999) (discussing
survey finding that workers think they have more rights than they actually do).
14 See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1783, 1794-97
(1996) (discussing absence of information about results).
15 On workers' ignorance of their legal rights, see Freeman & Rogers, supra note 13, at
118-22.
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4. In most circumstances, a switch in the default rule, or for that
matter a refusal to switch, will not be simple to justify on grounds of
efficiency or redistribution. When transaction costs are zero, either
allocation will be efficient. From the standpoint of redistribution, the
effects are likely to be modest (or nonexistent), at least as a general
rule. The reason is that the contractual setting wil usually allow ad-
justments by employers, the apparent "losers."
5. What really matters is welfare, not efficiency; the latter is best
understood as a crude proxy for the former. A switch in the default
rule might improve social welfare in general and workers' welfare in
particular. As an example, consider the second case given above,
where the switch might well increase savings without having any sig-
nificant adverse effect on workers. There is a related point: If work-
ers care about relative economic position, but not absolute economic
position, a switch of the default rule to workers might be justifiable on
welfare grounds, because the switch might give the employees real
benefits while also not imposing real costs on them.
It is also possible that switching the default rule wil have desira-
ble effects on norms and preferences, because it will inculcate a more
appropriate sense of how, and how much, to value the interests at
stake. To those who object that this approach is unacceptably pater-
nalistic, the best response is simple: When the default rule has an in-
evitable effect on valuation, there is no escaping issues of this kind,
and it is hopeless to attempt to "defer" to workers' preferences-
which are, by hypothesis, a function of the legal rule. It is possible,
however, that the endowment effect reflects no change in welfare with
different initial entitlements, but merely a difference in the bargaining
situation of employers and workers, and perhaps confusion about the
existence of opportunity costs.
The rest of the discussion will be devoted to an elaboration of
these ideas.
II
WHEN THE DEFAULT RULE WILL MAT=ER
According to the Coase Theorem, a change in the default rule
does not matter, at least if there are no transaction costs. 16 No matter
the default rule, the parties will bargain their way to a result that is
16 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2-15 (1960). It has
long been acknowledged, however, that wealth effects may mean that the initial entitle-
ment will affect ultimate outcomes. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56
(5th ed. 1998) (discussing wealth effect). But wealth effects are generally thought to be
small. The traditional analysis ignores the endowment effect.
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both efficient and the same. 17 It is obvious that this claim has large
implications for labor and employment law in particular. If the Coase
Theorem is correct, the default rules set by the law, for workers and
employers alike, do not matter, at least if transaction costs are low. It
is irrelevant whether employees or employers are given initial rights
with respect to leave time, vacation, health care, job security, age dis-
crimination, and more.
A. Workers' Endowments: The Wrongness of the Coase Theorem
Of all existing claims in behavioral law and economics, perhaps
the most well known is that, on this point, the Coase Theorem may
well be wrong.'8 No one claims that the Coase Theorem is wrong in-
sofar as it says that under the stated conditions, either allocation of
the entitlement will produce efficiency. Where the Coase Theorem
blunders is in suggesting that no matter the initial allocation of the
entitlement, people will bargain to the same result. The Coase Theo-
rem fails to account for the fact that the initial allocation seems to
create an endowment effect.19 When the endowment effect is at work,
those who initially receive a legal right value it more than they would
if the initial allocation had given the right to someone else. There is a
great deal of evidence to this effect.20
1. Standard Evidence
Several studies involved the effect of the initial allocation of such
objects as mugs and chocolate bars.2' The endowment effect was
found to be instantaneous: People initially allocated the relevant
good demanded a great deal more to sell it than people not initially
allocated the good were willing to pay to obtain it.22 Countless studies
have found a disparity between willingness to pay (for a good owned
by someone else) and willingness to accept (payment for a good al-
ready owned). 23 Some of these studies have shown an endowment
effect in a contractual setting, akin to that involved in labor and em-
ployment law. 24 As I have suggested, the default rule might matter,
not because of a "pure" endowment effect, but because it carries in-
17 See Coase, supra note 16, at 2-15.
18 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 211-29.
19 See Thaler, supra note 10, at 169, 184-86.
20 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Con-
tract Law, in Behavioral Law and Economics, supra note 11, at 311.
21 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 214-25 (describing several such studies).
22 Id. at 225-26.
23 For citations, see Thaler, supra note 10, at 168-69.
24 See Korobkin, supra note 20.
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formation about what most people do, or about what it is most reason-
able to do. In this event too, the default rule can have significant
consequences.
2. A New Experiment
I conducted a simple experiment for purposes of understanding
the effect of the default rule in the context of employment law. About
seventy-five randomly chosen law students were asked to answer
question 1, and about seventy-five randomly chosen law students were
asked to answer question 2.
Question 1:
Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large
city. Your salary will be $120,000. Under state law, all companies
must provide nonmanagerial employees, including associates at law
firms, with a minimum of two weeks in vacation time each year.
Suppose that the firm that you have chosen tells you that it will
allow you to have two extra weeks of vacation, but at a somewhat
reduced salary. What is the most that you would be willing to pay,
in reduced salary, to obtain those two extra weeks of vacation time?
(Assume that no adverse consequences could possibly come to you
from bargaining for that extra vacation time.)
Question 2:
Imagine that you have accepted a job with a law firm in a large
city. Your salary will be $120,000. Under state law, all companies
must provide nonmanagerial employees, including associates at law
firms, with a nonwaivable minimum of two weeks in vacation time
each year. State law also provides that all companies must provide
nonmanagerial employees, including associates at law firms, with a
waivable extra two weeks in vacation time each year. The extra two
weeks can be waived only as a result of "explicit, noncoerced agree-
ments" between the parties.
Suppose that the firm that you have chosen would be willing to
pay you a certain amount, in extra salary, to get you to waive your
right to the two extra weeks in vacation time. What is the least that
the firm would have to pay you, in extra salary, to give up those two
extra weeks? (Assume that no adverse consequences could possibly
come to you from your refusal to waive, or from your demanding a
high amount to waive.)
The results were dramatic. The median willingness to pay (Ques-
tion 1) was $6000, whereas the median willingness to accept (Question
2) was $13,000. The medians did not significantly vary between first-
year law students and law students in their second and third years.
The only noteworthy difference was that about four first-year students
refused, in response to Question 2, to name any amount, saying that
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no dollar figure would be "enough to make me give up my vacation."
These answers were excluded, and hence the observed difference in
medians, of more than two to one, can be said to understate the real
difference in responses.
Note that the answers to these two questions are in many respects
quite realistic. Law students are very much in the position of trading
off variables in the selection of work, and both vacation time and sal-
ary loom large in their decisions. Despite the somewhat artificial sur-
vey format, it is reasonable to think that the results, showing a
significant effect from the default rule, would be similar in the real
world.
3. Insurance
In the context of insurance, an unplanned, natural experiment
showed that the default rule can be very "sticky. '2 5 New Jersey cre-
ated a system in which the default insurance program for motorists
included a relatively low premium and no right to sue; purchasers
were allowed to deviate from the default program and to purchase the
right to sue by choosing a program with that right and also a higher
premium.26 By contrast, Pennsylvania offered a default program con-
taining a full right to sue and a relatively high premium; purchasers
could elect to switch to a new plan by "selling" the more ample right
to sue and paying a lower premium.2 7 In both cases, the default rule
tended to stick. A strong majority accepted the default rule in both
states, with only about twenty percent of New Jersey drivers acquiring
the full right to sue, and seventy-five percent of Pennsylvania drivers
retaining that right.28 Experiments confirm the basic effect, showing
that the value of the right to sue is much higher when it is presented as
part of the default package.29
It is not clear that the difference reflects a "pure" endowment
effect, involving a change in valuation as a result of the initial entitle-
ment. But the difference does demonstrate a large consequence from
a change in the default rule. It seems reasonable to speculate that in
many cases, the default rule carries information about ordinary or sen-
25 Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in Choices,
Values, and Frames 288, 294-95 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discuss-
ing this natural experiment); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and
Insurance Decisions, in Choices, Values, and Frames, supra, at 224, 238 (same).
26 Johnson et al., supra note 25, at 238.
27 Id.
2 Id.
29 Id. at 235-38.
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sible practice. This too is a central reason that the default rule can
matter.
From all this we might reach a simple conclusion: When labor
and employment law sets a default rule, it may well prove "sticky,"
because of its effect on employees' judgments and valuations. If a
default rule creates a right to a generous pension program, the out-
come will likely differ from that produced by a default rule creating
no such right. If there is a default rule against age discrimination, the
ultimate outcome could be quite different from that produced by a
default rule permitting age discrimination. In fact, the default rule
selected by employers will matter no less than that set by law. I now
turn to an example.
B. Private Default Packages and the Case of Savings
Some people think that workers do not save enough for retire-
ment. Without arguing the point, let us simply suppose, for purposes
of argument, that they are right. Might employees' failure to save be a
function of the default rule? Might a change in the default rule alter
savings rates? The evidence seems clear. A mere change in the de-
fault rule will dramatically alter employee behavior 3°-probably be-
cause in some contexts, the default rule carries information about the
ordinary and sensible course of action. Whatever the mechanism, the
default rule has significant consequences for employee behavior.
Note that the issue here involves an employer's decision, not about
whether the employer or employee should enjoy an entitlement, but
about the default rule governing the allocation of workers' benefits
between salary and retirement savings.
An important study has demonstrated the basic effect.3 1 For
some years, employees in a certain company would not be enrolled in
a 401(k) plan unless they affirmatively chose to do SO.32 The employer
instituted a change by which employees would be automatically en-
rolled, and would be removed from the program only if they so
chose.3 3 The change in the default option had dramatic effects. When
employees had three to fifteen months of tenure, the participation
rate was thirty-seven percent under the old plan; under the new plan,
the participation rate, for those with the same amount of tenure, was
30 See generally Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Iner-
tia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, http:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=223635 (Apr. 17, 2000) (showing large effect from default rule).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 3.
33 Id. at 4.
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eighty-six percent. Automatic enrollment had especially pronounced
effects on the participation rates of women and African-Americans. 34
In a separate phenomenon, the default rule also had a significant
effect on the chosen contribution rate. The default contribution rate
(three percent) tended to stick; a majority of employees maintained
that rate even though this particular rate was chosen by less than ten
percent of employees hired before the automatic enrollment.35 The
same result was found for the default allocation of the investment:
While less than six percent of employees chose a one hundred percent
investment allocation to the money market fund, a substantial major-
ity of employees chose that allocation when it was the default rule.3 6
As I have suggested, the significant effect from the default rule is
probably a product of its informational signal. 37 With respect to sav-
ings, the initially proposed plan carries a certain legitimacy, perhaps
because it seems to have resulted from some conscious thought about
what makes the most sense for the most people. This understanding is
supported by the finding that the largest effects, from the new default
rule, are shown by women and African Americans. We might specu-
late that members of such groups tend to be less confident in their
judgments in this domain and to have less experience in assessing dif-
ferent savings plans.
Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi have exploited the endow-
ment effect and loss aversion to propose a new plan, Save More To-
morrow, designed to increase savings by workers.38 The authors'
suggestion is that employers should offer employees the option to
choose a retirement plan that favors savings.39 Under the Save More
Tomorrow plan, employees are invited to join a plan in which they can
precommit to give a certain amount of their future salary increases to
their retirement savings.40 One rationale behind the proposal is that
while people would be reluctant to give some of their current salary to
savings (because they would then suffer a loss), they would be willing
to give some of their future salary increases to savings (because they
would then remain "gainers" after the increase). 41
34 Id. at 11.
35 Id. at 15.
36 Id. at 20.
37 I am grateful to Christine Jolls for pressing this point in conversation.
38 See Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: An Easy Way to
Increase Employee Saving 2 (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New
York University Law Review).
39 Id. at 2.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Would this plan have any effect? Thaler and Benartzi found a
dramatic impact. A company that adopted the plan found that the
plan was chosen by more than three-quarters of those offered it; that
almost all of those who adopted it remained in it; and that the conse-
quence of the plan was to increase average savings rates of those en-
rolled in the plan from 3.5% to 9.4% over sixteen months. 42
Significantly, only a tiny portion of those who joined the plan (less
than three percent) dropped out before two pay increases.43
The studies that I have just described show significant effects
from changes in the default option-but these changes are produced
by employers, not by law. Understood in this narrow form, the point
itself carries considerable importance. It suggests that voluntary be-
havior by employers, perhaps in concert with unions, can greatly af-
fect employees, not by mandating any particular course, but by
suggesting a new default option.44 Employers, acting together with
employees, might design any number of default compensation pack-
ages, giving employees some mixture of take-home pay, vacation time,
pension plan, job security, and protection from discrimination. What
we now know is that the default plan might well have significant be-
havioral consequences. This is especially likely if the default rule is
taken to reflect "best practices"; if so, people will be inclined to stick
with it.
Perhaps it will be thought that any suggested default plan would
represent an objectionable interference with workers' freedom of
choice. But because any default option is likely to stick, this objection
is implausible.45 A sensible approach for the future would involve
consultations between employers and groups of workers, not to man-
date any particular outcome, but to identify default rules that are
likely to be in the interest of most workers. Since any such default
rule will not work well for everyone, there should be an opportunity,
in ordinary circumstances, for workers to opt out if they wish.
The point has implications for law as well. With respect to sav-
ings, it is easy to imagine a statutory intervention designed not to
42 Id. at 4-5.
43 Id. at 5.
44 The point might help to explain the finding in Freeman & Rogers, supra note 13, at
68-81, that workers in unionized firms are almost unanimously satisfied with their union
and would not like a change. For most of these workers, unionization has become the
default option. Of course we cannot know the extent to which workers' satisfaction is the
product of this effect, or whether workers who have voted for a union are likely to like
unions.
45 See Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 38, at 7 ("The whole point of choosing a default
rule rather than a mandatory rule is to give people choices. As to the choice of the specific
default rule, there is no avoiding having some default rule.").
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mandate anything in particular, but to ensure a particular default rule.
Employers might be encouraged (through information or economic
incentives) or required to propose a certain savings package for em-
ployees, while at the same time allowing employees to divert some of
the money to salary if they wish. Perhaps a statutory program to this
effect could build on the Save More Tomorrow plan. It is even possi-
ble to imagine a system of Social Security reform that would make
creative use of default rules to offer workers starting points that would
be most likely to improve their welfare.
C. General Lessons
The domain of savings might reflect an unusually loud informa-
tional signal, but we know enough to know that the initial entitlement
might have large consequences in other domains.46 To the extent that
large effects can be expected from a change in the default rule, there
is a general lesson for labor law. If employees are given a waivable
right to be fired only for cause, to take vacation leave, to have a cer-
tain level of occupational safety, or to be free from age discrimination,
they might well value that right more than they would if the right were
allocated to employers in the first instance. The conclusion is that if a
default rule is switched, so that entitlements initially enjoyed by em-
ployers are now owned by employees, the outcome need not be the
same. Very generally, the entitlement will have a tendency to stick.
But there are some important qualifications. First, it is possible
that the default rule will matter less for large employers (such as Mc-
Donald's and General Motors) that tend to use mass form contracts.
Second, the default rule might not matter for a reason unrelated to the
Coase Theorem: People might not know about the default rule, and
they might not order their affairs by reference to it. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that workers and employers decide on job security, or vacation
time, or pension plans, without reference to the legal rule. Robert
Ellickson has shown, in some domains, that it is a mistake to be
"lawcentric"; people might well produce outcomes with little refer-
46 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in Behav-
ioral Law and Economics, supra note 11, at 13, 30-31 (arguing that endowment effect ex-
plains empirical findings in Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity
Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994)); Korobkin, supra note 20, at 116, 120-23 (showing
that default rule has large effect on negotiating parties' preferences for contract terms).
If the "opt-out" rule required employers to say that they were departing from ordi-
nary practice, the stickiness would increase. I am assuming throughout that the opt-out
procedure would require only an ordinary waiver. The analysis would be changed with
constraints on waiver.
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ence to legal rules.47 Norms, not traceable to law, may do the work of
law. To the extent that this is so, switching the default rule will have
no impact, because people do not enter into agreements with anything
like close reference to it.
Is this likely to be the case in most domains of labor and employ-
ment law? No general answer would make sense. But in the area of
labor-management relations, large employers, at least, are likely to
know about the nature of the governing default rules, and they are
likely to act on the basis of that understanding. If the law confers
initial entitlements on employees, employers are likely to know about
that fact, and to respond. Perhaps this step will not be necessary if
employers know that employees are unaware of what the law has
done; in that case, employers will have little to worry about in the
event that they do not "buy back" the relevant fight. But a sensible
employer is unlikely to be willing to take his chances with employee
ignorance. I now turn to the resulting questions.
III
DEFAULT RULES AND INFORMATION FLOW
The simplest effect of switching the default rule will therefore be
to increase the likelihood that it will end up where it was initially
placed. If workers are initially given certain rights or options, those
fights or options will tend to stick. But what will be the consequence
for bargaining in the labor market? A potential result-for labor and
employment law, a fortunate one-will be to ensure that more infor-
mation is disclosed to workers who might otherwise have overesti-
mated their legal rights, and also to the legal system. 48 In particular, a
switch of entitlement from employer to employee will increase the
likelihood that workers will know what the law has and has not given
them, and bargain accordingly. The optimistic view would be that a
switch of that sort might even overcome a market failure, in the form
of inadequate information on the part of employees. When the em-
ployer is given the initial entitlement, bargains might not represent
anything like a meeting of the minds. A switch of the default rule can
solve the problem.
In one sense, this point is entirely old hat. It is well known that
default rules can operate as "penalties" that impose the burden of dis-
closing information on those who have it, for the benefit of those who
47 See Ellickson, supra note 12, at 123-25 (discussing evidence that refutes legal
centralism).
48 This is a large theme in the law of contract. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at
87-107 (discussing, inter alia, incentives for producing information as rationale for design-
ing default rules).
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need it.49 But the point has not been greatly discussed in the context
of labor and employment law.: 0 What I add here is a behavioral sug-
gestion: For as yet ill-understood reasons, workers frequently, and
generally, have a false and exaggerated understanding of their legal
rights. It is for this reason that switching the entitlement from em-
ployers to employees might be especially desirable, as a means of cor-
recting employee ignorance.
To see why this is so, imagine a situation, by itself apparently un-
problematic, in which the right is initially vested in employers, and
employees rarely bargain for that right. It might be, for example, that
employers have a right to fire employees at will, or to replace strikers
permanently, or to deny employees parental leave, occupational
safety, or freedom from age discrimination. If the entitlement tends
to stay where it was initially allocated, the reason might be (1) signifi-
cant transaction costs, (2) little employee enthusiasm for purchasing
the right at the market price, (3) an endowment effect, or (4) employ-
ees' failure to know that they do not have the right in any case. Rea-
sons (1) and (2) can be analyzed conventionally. If transaction costs
are high, a central efficiency question is whether the default rule
"mimics the market," in the sense that it reflects what the parties
would have done if they had bargained.51 If employees do not at-
tempt to purchase the right at market price, there seems to be no
problem from the standpoint of efficiency, though perhaps there is
some other reason for concern.52 I have just discussed the endowment
effect. For present purposes, the interesting case is (4)-employee ig-
norance about the content of the default rule.
There is growing evidence that workers overestimate their legal
rights-a phenomenon that we might label the "fairness heuristic," by
which employees believe that the law is what (they think) fair law
would be. For example, Pauline Kim has shown that employees gen-
erally believe that the legal rule is one of "for cause" rather than "at
49 See id. (discussing penalty defaults).
50 The leading exception is Issacharoff, supra note 14 (discussing, inter alia, default
rules in labor law), from which I have learned a great deal. The point is also treated in
Cynthia Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights and Why Does It Mat-
ter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 6 (2002) (exploring workers' ignorance of legal rights); Pauline T.
Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge,
1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447 (same).
51 This oversimplifies some complex issues. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 87-
107 (arguing that legal rules should not necessarily always produce results that parties
would have wanted).
52 For example, there is a possibility of uninformed or otherwise objectionable
preferences.
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will"-that, in other words, employees can be fired only for cause.5 3
Of course employees are wrong on this point; without a contractual
provision giving them job security, they do not, in fact, have a right
not to be discharged "at will." On this point employees systematically
err; they think that they have a right that they lack. Richard Freeman
and Joel Rogers have generalized this finding, showing that workers
believe that they have a number of rights that they in fact lack.5 4
Workers believe, for example, that employers cannot hire permanent
replacements for strikers; that employers cannot require employees to
do dangerous work; that workers have ample rights against arbitrary
discharge. 55
These findings do not establish that employees should be given a
right to job security or to anything else. But they do appear to estab-
lish a serious problem with the current situation, in the form of perva-
sive worker overestimation of their legal rights.56 To be sure, it is
possible that this is not a reason for special concern, at least if workers
are speaking for employers' ordinary practices (as seems plausible in
the context of job security). If employees have the law wrong, but the
practices right, the problem is not so troublesome. But something
does seem to be amiss if workers believe that they have legal rights
that they lack. An obvious remedy would be to switch the default
rule, not to ensure that employees have job security and so forth, but
to ensure that whatever they have, it is a product of informed bargain-
ing. Here, the likely consequence of a switch in the default rule, giv-
ing employees a right (for example) to be fired only for cause, would
be to ensure that employers would buy the right via contract if that is
where, on conventional grounds, the right belongs.5 7 And if the idea
is sound, it might be applied in many other areas in which employees
erroneously believe that they have certain legal rights.
Nor is this idea entirely foreign to labor and employment law.
State courts have made significant inroads on the at-will rule, by tak-
ing ambiguous "promises" from employers as a basis for creating a
right to job security.58 A possible understanding of these cases is close
to what I have suggested here: Employees should not be unaware of
53 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 105 (1997) (dis-
cussing worker ignorance of legal rights); Kim, supra note 50, at 448-65 (same); see also
Estlund, supra note 50, at 7.
54 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 13, at 118-22.
55 Id. at 118-21.
56 See id.
57 See Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 1794-97.
58 For an overview, see Mark A. Rothstein et al., Employment Law 532-35 (1994) (dis-
cussing cases involving oral promises).
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their rights, and doctrines should be developed to ensure that when
they are entering into employment contracts, they are aware of what
they do and do not have. With a doctrine that takes ambiguous state-
ments, apparently promising job security, as a basis for rights of job
security, it is possible to give employers a good incentive to tell em-
ployees exactly where they stand. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests
that employers in Michigan have done exactly this-responding to the
cases by giving employees a clear signal that they lack job security.
The advantage of this approach is that it promotes a better informa-
tion flow between the parties, so that workers are more likely to know
what they are (not) getting.59
Of course, an understanding of behavioral economics raises many
questions about allowing waiver at all. 60 Perhaps employees will be
unaware of what they are waiving. Perhaps they will think that they
have the relevant rights even after waiver. Perhaps they will engage in
wishful thinking. But at the very least, a switch of the default rule will
increase the information that is provided to employees-and that
probably counts as a good thing.
IV
DEFAULT RULES AND COGNITIVE OR
MOTIVATIONAL FAILURE
For those concerned about improving the welfare of employees, it
might seem to make sense to create default rules that favor workers.
If what matters is the welfare of workers, should workers not be given
certain rights, with the proviso that employers might be able to buy
them if workers find the bargain to be worthwhile?
In general, the implication of the question is not entirely wrong.6'
But there is an important qualification. Suppose that a significant en-
dowment effect accompanies the switch of the default rule. Suppose
too that employees are extremely reluctant to trade the relevant right,
so much so that employers are infrequently willing to offer enough to
produce a trade. At first glance, nothing seems amiss; the entitlement
59 There is, however, a possible disadvantage: Employees might not be getting any-
thing they do not really have, because arbitrary discharges are (on one plausible view)
unlikely in a competitive market. If this is so, the switch of the rule produces wasted
paperwork. Note also that it is possible that even with a change in default rule, employees
will not understand, or believe, that they are waiving their rights. Kim's data suggests that
many employees will not even believe in the legal effectiveness of a waiver. Kim, supra
note 53, at 137 tbl.2.
60 Sunstein, supra note 4, at 240-43.
61 See infra Part V.
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should stay where it was initially allocated, because employees value it
more than employers do (given that initial allocation).
But here we can find another twist from behavioral economics:
Some employees might refuse to waive because of cognitive and moti-
vational problems. Suppose, for example, that most workers have lit-
tle to gain from a right to be fired only for cause, because in a market
economy, such workers are not really at risk.62 Why would an em-
ployer fire someone without cause? In that event, it should be ex-
pected that workers would be willing to waive for a relatively low
price. But at least it is possible that workers will refuse to do so, sim-
ply because they "overvalue" the right, and hence will not sell except
for a price that is too high, from the standpoint of their own welfare.
Workers might, for example, overestimate the probability that the
small risk will come to fruition, perhaps because they can think of a
salient example.63 We do not have the empirical work that would jus-
tify an unequivocal view on this issue. But we know enough to know
that the risk is real.
The cautionary lesson here is that concern about workers' waiv-
ers is a double-edged sword. In some circumstances, that concern jus-
tifies the creation of nonwaivable workers' rights.64 But in some
circumstances, the same concern justifies a system of waivable em-
ployers' rights, on the theory that a default rule in favor of workers
might jeopardize workers' own welfare.
V
WHICH DEFAULT RULE? EFFICIENCY, DISTRIUTION,
AND WELFARE
The largest question remains: In the presence of an endowment
effect, or some other stickiness in the initial entitlement, which default
rule is best? To answer this question, it is necessary to identify the
criteria by which to answer that question.
A. Efficiency
On a familiar view, the default rule should be chosen by the effi-
ciency criterion. The question is which default rule will promote effi-
ciency-the standard claim in the economic analysis of law. 65
62 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947
(1984) (defending contract at will as being in mutual interest of parties).
63 Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk 104
(1992) (suggesting that people overestimate low probability risks).
64 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 240-43.
65 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 89-91.
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To be sure, no sensible person would contend that efficiency is
the only thing that labor and employment law should be concerned
with. Few people, however, would deny that an efficiency loss is at
least relevant to the inquiry, because it is relevant to the welfare of
workers and everyone else. But there is a serious problem in using
the efficiency criterion to choose among default rules (when transac-
tion costs are zero). If the endowment effect is at work, the two re-
sults are different, but they will both be efficient. If an employee
refuses to trade a right to be free from age discrimination except at a
very high price, and if employers will not offer that price, the out-
come-no trade-is efficient. If an employee is not willing to buy a
right to be free from age discrimination, and if employers will not sell
that right except at a very high price, the outcome-no trade-is also
efficient. In the presence of an endowment effect, the efficiency crite-
rion is indeterminate and therefore unhelpful.
To be sure, familiar economic analysis can suggest a default rule
in the face of transaction costs, by seeing whether one or another rule
"mimics the market" by replicating the likely outcome of bargaining,
or if this inquiry proves difficult, by choosing a penalty that produces
clarity from the parties.66 But if there are no transaction costs, and if
different default rules produce different but efficient outcomes, eco-
nomic analysis has little to say about how to choose among the com-
peting possible rules.
The point can be clarified with a simple example. Suppose that
most employees would be willing to purchase a right to job security
for $200. Suppose that most employers would be willing to sell it for
$250. In these circumstances, most contracts will be at will; this is the
efficient outcome. But suppose that if employees are initially given
the right, they will trade it only for $300-and that in the same circum-
stances, most employers (showing no endowment effect) would be
willing to buy it for $250. In these circumstances, most contracts will
be for cause. Two different outcomes are efficient, and they are dif-
ferent only because of the difference in the initial allocation of the
entitlement.67
At this stage the efficiency criterion seems indeterminate. For
the moment, we should note that willingness to pay (WTP) and will-
ingness to accept (WTA) are important only insofar as they provide
administrable indications of the welfare gain from a trade. When the
endowment effect means that WTP and WTA are different, there are
66 See id. at 88-93.
67 If the example seems unrealistic, return to the vacation time experiment in supra
Part II.A.2.
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two interesting possibilities. First, the difference might measure actual
welfare differences, depending on the default rule. Second, the differ-
ence between WTP and WTA might have nothing to do with welfare
at all; it might be produced by confusion, by bargaining behavior, or
something else not directly related to workers' welfare under different
default rules. I will return to the problem shortly.
B. Distribution
Might some progress be made by asking about distribution? Sup-
pose that there is a general view that in cases of doubt, the law should
distribute resources to employees rather than employers. Certainly
the impetus for much of labor law has been to transfer resources in
this way.
To be sure, it is not clear that this view makes sense, even for
those who favor more egalitarian distributions. Many employees are
not poor; many poor people are not employees; and efforts to redis-
tribute resources from employers to employees are not the same as
efforts to redistribute directly from rich to poor. In any case the effect
of those efforts may be to increase prices, which is hardly good for
poor people. Increased prices are a kind of regressive tax; they are
especially hard on the poor. A progressive income tax is far more
likely to be an effective method of redistributing income than employ-
ment and labor law.68 But at least it is possible to favor a transfer of
resources from employers to employees-perhaps on the ground that
workers as such receive too little of the proceeds from work, perhaps
with the thought that anything that distributes resources from employ-
ers to employees will tend to increase equality in the distribution of
income. If these thoughts turn out to be wrong, we might be able to
venture more targeted regulations that have the desired effect.
At first glance, there might seem to be a plausible argument, on
grounds of redistribution, for switching entitlements from employers
to employees, regardless of the extent of the endowment effect. Em-
ployee wealth would appear to be increased by a decision allocating
entitlements to employees rather than employers. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that employees are suddenly given a right to participate in all
company decisions-a right that employers can buy for a fee. 69 At
least for current employees, the new entitlement should have signifi-
cant redistributive effects, because employers are likely to be willing
to pay a good deal to reclaim the right. If, then, the entitlement is
68 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 118-27 (2d
ed. 1989) (assessing effects of attempted redistribution).
69 I owe the example to Eric Posner.
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quite valuable, the shift from employer to employee should, at first
glance, have substantial redistributive consequences. The extent of
the consequence depends on the value of the entitlement.
But in the contractual setting that typifies labor and employment
law, things are far more complicated, and far less promising, for those
who seek to promote redistribution through switching the entitle-
ment.70 If employees are given an entitlement, whether alienable or
inalienable, the rest of the contractual package is likely to be adjusted
accordingly. A right to participate in company decisions, if not
traded, will be met with some kind of market response-through, for
example, higher prices, less employment, or lower wages. As a result
of the enactment of workers' compensation and parental leave pro-
grams, for example, many workers lost almost as much in wages as
they gained in the relevant rights.71 In the context of protection
against discrimination on the basis of disability, employers appeared
to respond not by cutting wages but by decreasing hiring of disabled
people.72
From the standpoint of redistribution, the question for labor and
employment law is the incidence of the cost, faced only initially by
employers, of the switched entitlement. There is a growing body of
work, both theoretical and empirical, on the distributional conse-
quence of mandatory terms,73 and the issues are not altogether differ-
ent for switched default rules. A grossly simplified overview: In
general, mandatory terms are most unlikely to produce significant dis-
tributional gains. For accommodation mandates and antidiscrimina-
tion provisions, such gains are possible, but only if the relevant law is
fully binding in practice. In order to ascertain the effects of
70 For support and a valuable analysis in the analogous area of consumer protection,
see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 365-66, 369-72 (1991) (doubting redistrib-
utive effects).
71 See Gruber, supra note 46, at 623-29 (finding wage offsets); Jolls, supra note 5, at
296-300 (same); see also Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for
the Passage of Workers' Compensation Laws?, 110 Q.J. Econ. 713, 724-37 (1995) (finding
substantial wage offsets). Fishback and Kantor note that:
Analysis of the effect of the introduction of workers' compensation on wages
shows that in the coal and lumber industries, workers experienced substantial
wage offsets. In the coal industry the offsets were large enough to cover not
only the expected monetary value of the benefits, but also the employers' costs
of purchasing the insurance to provide those benefits.
Id. at 736.
72 See Jolls, supra note 5, at 276-77 (discussing disemployment effect).
73 See id. at 243-61 (discussing effects of mandatory accommodation rules); Lawrence
H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers
& Proceedings), May 1989, at 177, 182 (discussing effects of mandatory benefits); see also
Craswell, supra note 70, at 361-72.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 77:106
HeinOnline  -- 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 126 2002
SWITCHING THE DEFAULT RULE
mandatory terms, it is necessary to ask questions about (1) the respon-
siveness of consumers to price increases, (2) the comparison between
the value of the benefit and the cost of providing it, (3) the respon-
siveness of prospective and current workers to wage decreases, and
(4) the cost, to employers, of reducing the number of workers. If the
cheapest response to higher costs, for employers, is to raise prices,
that is what they will do; if the cheapest response is to cut wages or
decrease the number of employees, they i choose that route. In the
employment context, it is difficult to formulate a simple prediction.
But there is a significant risk that any redistributive gain will be nulli-
fied, at least in part, through readjustment of the wage package. On
plausible assumptions, workers will lose, in wages, some or much of
what they gain as a result of the switched entitlement.74
This does not mean that a switch cannot be justified on distribu-
tive grounds. Workers' compensation programs, for example, may
have produced distributive gains in the unionized sector, by giving
workers a benefit that was not offset by wage cuts.75 But there is no
reason for great confidence, in the abstract, that there will be a signifi-
cant distributive gain from the switch. If this is true for nonwaivable
rights, it is true too for waivable rights, many of which -Will be waived,
with no significant distributional shifts.
In the standard analysis of mandates directed to workers as a
whole,76 distributive gains and efficiency gains march hand-in-hand;
without efficiency gains, there can be no distributive gains.77 Because
of the empirical considerations just discussed, and for reasons elabo-
rated by Christine Jolls, this claim is too simple: It is imaginable that
workers will benefit, on balance, from an inefficient mandate.7 But
even if this is right, the claim that a switch in entitlements will make
for distributional improvements is quite fragile, with the exception of
accommodation mandates (Jolls's emphasis), on which I am not focus-
ing here.79
74 See Jolls, supra note 5, at 235-37; see also the discussion of wage cuts in the nonu-
nionized sector in Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare
State 64-69 (2000).
75 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 64-69 ("[W]e cannot reject the hypothesis
that unionized workers experienced no wage offset.").
76 See Summers, supra note 73, at 178 (providing efficiency arguments for mandating
employee benefits).
77 See Craswell, supra note 70, at 365-66.
78 Jolls, supra note 5, at 243-72.
79 See id. at 243-72.
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C. Welfare
Sensible conclusions, from what has been said thus far, are that
(1) a switch of the entitlement will be neither good nor bad on effi-
ciency grounds, and (2) the switch might possibly be justified on redis-
tributive grounds, but this is unlikely, and the analysis depends on a
complex inquiry into the incidence of the burden represented by these
greater costs. Is there any other way to resolve the problem?
In theory, at least, it is worthwhile to ask whether the aggregate
welfare of employers and employees is improved with one or another
default rule. I have noted that "efficiency," as understood through the
criterion of WTP (or WTA) is at best a proxy for welfare, suitable for
guiding policy only because it provides an administrable, though quite
crude, way of inquiring into welfare consequences. 80 If the efficiency
calculus proves unhelpful, perhaps we should avoid the middleman
and go to welfare directly. If the difference between WTP and WTA
has nothing to do with a difference in welfare, we have reason to think
that a switch in the entitlement will matter neither to efficiency nor to
welfare. If a new default rule would give the winners more than the
losers lose, it will be justified on welfare grounds, endowment effect,
or no endowment effect. The most serious difficulty here is that the
legal system lacks direct access to welfare consequences, and in this
setting, the normal proxies are unreliable.
1. Savings
To make the analysis tractable, begin with the relatively easy case
of savings. If a default rule increases savings, and if the increase im-
proves workers' welfare, the case for a prosavings default rule seems
extremely plausible. Suppose, for example, that workers lose little or
nothing from the reduction in take-home pay but that they gain signif-
icantly from the increase in savings. If so, and if employers lose noth-
ing, the switch seems easily defensible on welfare grounds.
What I am suggesting here is that with the suggested default rule,
workers will be better off if they will accumulate more in the way of
savings, and if they will not much suffer, in terms of welfare, from the
somewhat lower weekly take-home pay. Of course some workers will
be somewhat worse off with a reduction in take-home pay, and for
some, that welfare loss will not be overcome by the increase in sav-
ings. And at some point, a transfer of money from salary to savings
would certainly hurt most or all employees. But we are speaking here
only of a default rule, allowing workers to opt out; and for the small
80 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
Yale L.J. 185-86 (1999) (making similar critique of efficiency).
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salary reductions involved here, automatic enrollment plans, sug-
gested by employers or mandated by law, seem substantial
improvements.
2. Welfare, Utility, and Relative Position
But many of the cases that I have discussed are far more compli-
cated. If we had direct access to the welfare of employers and em-
ployees, we might be able to make choices on grounds of welfare. Of
course the idea of "welfare" can be specified in many different ways.8'
To simplify matters, let us assume, without insisting on the point, that
"utility" is what is most important. Might one or another default rule
increase utility? This is certainly possible. After a switch, aggregate
utility might be increased, perhaps because employees gain more than
employers lose. Suppose, for example, that employees' utility is far
higher if they have a right to job security, or parental leave, or paid
vacations; suppose too that the utility loss (because of costs faced ini-
tially by employers, with the accompanying incidence of those costs) is
not very high. If this is so, the argument for the switch seems quite
plausible.
In pointing to the importance of relative (as opposed to absolute)
economic position, some people have made an argument of just this
sort on behalf of mandatory terms in employment contracts. s2 The
argument is that mandatory terms can improve workers' welfare if
they give workers an important good (such as improved safety or in-
creased leisure time) while diminishing absolute, but not relative, in-
come. A shift of this kind would improve workers' welfare if the
reduction in absolute income does not really reduce workers' welfare
and if the new good leads, for all or most workers, to a welfare
improvement.
Some such claims might be reasonable in the context of a switch
in the default rule, especially, but not only, if relative economic posi-
tion is what matters to workers. At least this is so if competition over
relative position does not rematerialize as workers decide whether to
waive. The switch in the default rule might turn out to be a special
case of the argument just given: Any income loss will not matter
81 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Ap-
proach 111-61 (2000) (discussing different understanding of welfare); Amartya Sen, Devel-
opment as Freedom 72-81 (1999) (arguing that quality of life should be measured by
freedom, not wealth).
82 See Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond 144-46 (1985) (discussing relative
position as ground for nonwaivable terms); see also Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 323, 372-73 (2001) (same);
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 266-70 (same).
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much, because relative position will be held constant, and relative po-
sition is what matters. If relative position is not what matters, it is
nonetheless possible that employee welfare will be improved after the
switch. The problem is that the legal system is likely to lack the tools
to know whether this is so. One possible avenue for inquiry would
involve objective indicators of welfare-suicide attempts, health, lon-
gevity-but of course it will be most difficult, in this context, to con-
trol for confounding variables.
3. Sources of the Endowment Effect
Another possibility would be to inquire into the basis for the en-
dowment effect in the particular case. If we know why the endow-
ment effect exists, we might be able to make some progress in
deciding on the default rule. In asking about whether to use WTP or
instead WTA, some progress has been made on this question.83 Sup-
pose, for example, that willingness to pay is lower than willingness to
accept because of wealth effects: WTP is constrained by existing hold-
ings, as WTA is not. If this is so, we might choose WTA, on the
ground that it is a more accurate measure of the value of the good in
question.84 But there is a serious problem with this argument: The
difference between WTP and WTA might have nothing to do with a
general wealth effect, as demonstrated by the fact that it has been
observed in many contexts lacking significant wealth effects. 85 When
workers demand more for an entitlement than they would be willing
to pay for it, the reason need not be the wealth effects of the default
rule.
What, then, accounts for the endowment effect? The question
has no obvious answer.86 It might be that the effect is "hard-wired"; it
might be a fact of human psychology that more is demanded to relin-
quish ownership of X than to obtain X in the first instance. Or per-
haps the endowment effect has to do, not with the higher actual value
of things owned, but with an asymmetry in anticipated after-the-fact
regret. People might fear that they would regret a change from the
existing rule, and this bias in anticipated regret might play a role in
creating the endowment effect. According to informal discussions,
83 See Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward
a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 663, 675-97 (1994) (describ-
ing possible sources of disparity).
84 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. Legal Stud.
225, 229-34 (1991) (arguing for willingness to accept).
85 See Korobkin, supra note 83, at 680.
86 See id. at 689-97 (discussing possible reasons for endowment effect).
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this explanation seems to have played a role in the vacation time ex-
periment reported in Part I.
Perhaps people, and workers in particular, believe that the initial
allocation of the entitlement carries a certain moral weight, or pre-
sumptive validity, so much so as to drive a wedge between WTP and
WTA. In the context of insurance plans, this does seem to be the case.
In the absence of information about what most people do, or about
what it is reasonable to do, people seem to follow the default rule. As
I have suggested, the strong effect of the default rule for African
Americans and women might be explicable in these terms. The effect
of the vacation plan default rule probably has something to do with
this explanation as well. And in some circumstances, selling a good
might appear illegitimate, an insult to dignity.87
Perhaps some people simply ignore, much of the time, the exis-
tence of opportunity costs. s8 For goods that are not simply money
tokens, people appear to think that continued ownership is costless, or
that the cost of not selling is far less than it is in effect. This might well
be simple confusion. Do people really think that two weeks of vaca-
tion are worth $13,000? Or do people think, in the context of a cer-
tain default rule, that by refusing to accept $12,000, they are not really
giving up much at all? If the endowment effect comes from ignoring
opportunity costs, we should probably not use WTA, and there is no
good reason to switch the default rule to workers.
A better understanding of the source of the endowment effect
could help us to know whether the default rule should be switched on
welfare grounds. One thing that we would like to know is whether the
difference between WTP and WTA, in the context of labor law, re-
flects real welfare or utility differences between different states of af-
fairs, or is instead an artifact of the bargaining situation and confusion
about opportunity costs. I suspect that in many contexts, bargaining
considerations, alongside that confusion, are responsible; the mugs
and chocolates experiments seem to support that conclusion.89 If this
is so, WTP is better than WTA, because the higher amount repre-
sented by WTA does not really mean that people's utility will be
higher as a result of having the initial allocation. And if this is so, the
existence of an effect, from the initial entitlement, does not argue for
shifting the entitlement to workers.
87 Id. at 691-94.
88 See Thaler, supra note 10, at 3, 27, 131-32 (discussing underweighting of opportunity
costs).
89 See Kahneman et al., supra note 11, at 211-25.
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D. Preferences and Value Formation
More controversially, we might think that people's lives will sim-
ply be better if the endowment effect pushes valuation in one direc-
tion rather than another. To make the point vividly, suppose that a
legal system is considering whether to give employees a presumptive
right to be free from sexual harassment, or instead to say that employ-
ers can engage in sexual harassment unless employees can buy a right
to be free from it. It is easy to imagine that if employees are given
that presumptive right, they will be most reluctant to give it up. They
would demand a high premium for the right not to be subject to (some
probability of) sexual harassment; they might refuse to trade that right
even for a large fee. The clear implication is that workers will value
the right to be free from sexual harassment more highly if they have
an initial right to that freedom. If it is believed that the higher valua-
tion of that right is better, then granting the initial right to employees
might well be appropriate. It is even possible to think, on this ground,
that the right should be inalienable. 90 But short of accepting this con-
clusion, a shift of the right from employer to employee might well be
best.
It is possible to object that an inquiry of this kind is unacceptably
paternalistic and partisan-that it takes a stand on appropriate prefer-
ences and values. But this is a weak objection.91 If the endowment
effect is at work, there is no avoiding a legal effect on workers' prefer-
ences. Whatever the content of the legal rule, preferences will be af-
fected (if there is an endowment effect). A preference-shaping effect,
from the default rule, is inevitable. If this is so, a sensible question is
how labor and employment law might create a preferable system of
values. To be sure, it is not easy to answer that question, not least
because it raises normative issues on which reasonable people will dif-
fer. But let me begin with some controversial suggestions: It would
be highly desirable if workers placed a very high premium on ensuring
that workplaces are safe; on spending time with young children, with
relatives who are sick, and with their families; and on making decent
provision for retirement. To the extent that default rules will increase
90 See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 261-64 (discussing waiver of right to be free from
discrimination).
91 It should be recalled here that, as a historical matter, enthusiasm for markets was
itself a product, not of neutrality about preferences, but instead of a desire to produce
preferences of a certain sort, while encouraging independence, entrepreneurship, and in-
difference to certain ascriptive characteristics. See Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and
the Interests 69-113 (1977) (discussing justification of market as way of "softening" social
relationships).
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workers' interests in these goods, a switch in the default rule, by em-
ployers or by law, would be a good idea.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have explored the possibility of producing labor
law reform through a simple step: Switch the default rule. More par-
ticularly, labor law reform might promote a situation in which work-
ers, rather than employers, have more presumptive rights, to be
tradable only through voluntary bargaining.
Echoing the emerging orthodoxy in behavioral law and econom-
ics, I have argued that the default rule might well matter. If the legal
rule has an endowment effect, it is potentially important to ultimate
outcomes, even in the absence of transaction costs. The principal
qualification here is that in some domains, workers and employers
might order their affairs with little or no reference to legal rules. I
have also urged that a switch in the default rule, to an initial allocation
in favor of employees, might have the fortunate result of ensuring that
important information is disclosed to employees-a corrective to what
seems to be a "fairness heuristic" by which people identify likely legal
rules. By itself this is an argument in favor of the switch.
I have also urged that considerations of efficiency and distribu-
tion are unlikely to argue strongly in favor of maintaining or switching
the default rule. If transaction costs are zero, the outcome will be
efficient, no matter the initial allocation. If the endowment effect is at
work, the outcome will not be the same, but it will be efficient. At
first glance, the efficiency criterion therefore seems indeterminate. As
a distributional matter, a grant of entitlements to employees might
make employees somewhat wealthier. But market readjustments will
ultimately force someone-perhaps workers, perhaps consumers-to
bear the resulting cost, and it is quite possible that the adjustment will
swallow the redistributive effect, perhaps through changes in the rest
of the wage package. Significant distributive changes should not be
expected from switching default rules in labor and employment law.
We have also seen the possibility that the endowment effect re-
flects no real difference in terms of welfare under different default
rules, but something about the different bargaining situations in which
owners and buyers find themselves. Nonetheless, I have suggested
several grounds on which a switch in the default rule might be justi-
fied. Sometimes such a switch will produce relatively clear improve-
ments in terms of workers' welfare. If, for example, the consequence
of the switch is to increase savings without producing any real harm,
the new default rule seems to produce an unambiguous improvement.
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More controversially, I have suggested that a switch might be justified
because of its desirable effects on individual and social valuations of
the rights at stake. This is not a standard basis for a choice of default
rule. But in some cases, at least, it seems the only basis on which the
choice might be made.
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